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INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

LATIN AMERICA: COUNTERTERRORISM AND TRENDS IN TERRORISM(U)


11 AUGUST 1978

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Intelligence

Appraisal

LATIN AMERICA:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AND

TRENDS IN TERRORISM (U)



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PREPARED BY

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THE INFLUENTIAL SERVICE CHIEFS IN CONDOC



ARGENTINA'S
BRIG. GEN. CARLOS MARTINEZ



CHILE'S
BRIG. GEN. ODIANER MENA SALINAS



PARAGUAY'S
PASTOR CORONEL

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TRENDS IN TERRORISM: COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE
REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA (U)


Summary

~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON)~~ Operation Condor is an agreement established by the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay to promote intelligence exchange among their respective services and to provide for long-range cooperation in countering terrorist and subversive activities in Latin America. Operation Condor is moving to set up a single computerized data bank in Santiago, Chile, to act as a central registry for biographic cards and files contributed by each of the participating intelligence organizations and to operate a "Condortel" communications network designed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence information among participants.

~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON)~~ In a separate agreement, consistent with Condor objectives, the Argentine, Uruguayan, and Chilean intelligence services have agreed to participate in cooperative covert operations in Europe against the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) and prominent Latin American terrorists and insurgents such as Argentine Montonero leader, Mario Firmenich. Although thoroughly dominated from its formation in 1974 until recently by the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, the JCR also includes the National Liberation Army of Bolivia, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left of Chile, and the National Liberation Movement-Tupamoros of Uruguay as charter members of the organization. From its inception, the JCR was envisaged as a source of strategic planning for the Latin terrorist/insurgent movement, in general, and as a supranational logistic organization which would lend assistance, training, expertise, and encouragement to the various national terrorist/insurgent groups. The JCR established headquarters for its organization in Europe, alternating between Paris and Lisbon most of the time.

~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT)~~ During the 1974-1976 period, the JCR frequently supported efforts to initiate and encourage terrorist activities in Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Then, in April 1977, the Latin American connection in Europe took on an element which, in general terms, it had previously lacked -- a European target focus. This development raised concern that eventually the JCR might become involved in European terrorist operations if it were frustrated in Latin America. Signs of the advent of such frustration have already begun to accumulate. Despite rather active support and propaganda efforts through the fall of 1976, JCR activities in both Europe and Latin America have tapered off significantly.

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**SENIOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CHIEFS
IN CONDOR**

1 — Condortel Code

*Currently, Brazil maintains only an observer status

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~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN)~~ In early 1978, during JCR-sponsored meetings in Madrid and Paris, the organization apparently began a major effort to reinvigorate itself by broadening its base of operations through increased cooperation with terrorist/insurrectionist groups active in European operations. Although the JCR intends to continue its efforts in Latin America, it may feel the need to diversify in the hope of achieving operational successes elsewhere to bolster its reputation. Meanwhile, the internal security operations of the Condor countries and others in Latin America have apparently for the present largely stymied the JCR/revolutionary exiles' dream of returning to reinvigorate insurrectionist operations on a large scale. Basically, it appears that the national groups which have worked with the JCR lack the ability to seriously threaten the stability of their respective countries, while the JCR, for its part, lacks the means to tip the balance in the groups' favor.

Discussion

Operation Condor

~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON)~~ During the first six months of 1976, a series of meetings were held between representatives of various Latin American intelligence organizations which culminated in establishment of the system known as Operation Condor. Condor was set up following discussions among representatives of the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to promote intelligence exchange among their respective services and to provide for long-range cooperation in countering terrorist and subversive activities in Latin America. Subsequently, in late 1977, both Ecuador and Peru were also incorporated into the Condor network. However, no sooner was the group established than Brazil chose to severely limit its participation after some fellow Condor members apparently resisted Brazilian efforts to dominate the group.

~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT)~~ The agreement establishing the Condor network envisages establishment of a single computerized data bank in Santiago, Chile, to act as a central registry for biographic cards and files contributed by each of the participating intelligence organizations. The Argentine Intelligence Service also agreed to donate communications equipment to permit establishment of a "Condorte!" communications network designed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence information among participants. In a separate agreement, consistent with Condor objectives, the Argentine, Uruguayan, and Chilean intelligence services agreed to participate in cooperative covert operations in Europe against the JCR and prominent Latin American terrorists and insurgents such as Argentine Montonero leader Mario Firmenich.

~~(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON)~~ Additionally, the Argentine and Chilean intelligence services have agreed to put instructional

facilities of their respective intelligence training schools at the disposal of Condor so that instructors and students from other Condor countries may use them. Furthermore, in late 1977, Argentina provided Hagelin Crypto H-4605 equipment to Condortel to enhance the security of its teletype nets. Argentina has also agreed to host the Condor Editing Center in Buenos Aires where facilities are being assembled to handle limited edition publication of intelligence documents required by Condor members.

(S//WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Condor's operations against subversive targets are controlled out of an operations center in Argentina and are executed by teams composed of members from participating services. According to regulations, the operations will "intercept their targets, carry out their missions, and escape." Communications for operations in Latin America are to be provided by Condortel facilities. Operations conducted elsewhere are to rely upon coded messages transmitted by public cable or telephonic facilities, while documentation and operational equipment are to be provided either by diplomatic pouch or via courier. Subversive targets outside Latin America appear to be confined to exiled Latin American terrorists and insurrectionists, many of whom are associated in one way or another with the JCR.

The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta

(S//WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The JCR was the brain-child of the late Mario Santucho, then leader of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Although thoroughly dominated from its formation in 1974 until recently by the ERP, the JCR also includes the National Liberation Army of Bolivia, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile, and Uruguay's National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros as charter members of the organization.

(S//WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) From its inception, the JCR was envisaged as a source of strategic planning for the Latin terrorist/insurgent movements, in general, and as a supranational logistic organization which would lend assistance, training, expertise, and encouragement to the various national terrorist/insurgent groups. For example, beginning in April 1975, the JCR set up workshops principally in Portugal in order to save money for member groups by training them to manufacture their own weapons. Eventually, JCR workshops in Argentina and Europe reached the point where they were producing a not-too-durable submachine gun, rocket grenades (in very small quantities), bazookas, and rocket launchers.

(S//WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The JCR has established headquarters for its organization in Europe, alternating between Paris and Lisbon most of the time. The extensive Latin American community of expatriots living in Paris (about 25,000 people, of whom 2,000 are students) and the complex revolutionary network which has been established in that

community with the aid of the Cuban Embassy continue to make Paris a natural hub for JCR activities. The JCR has also been well represented in Stockholm, Lisbon, and various cities in Italy through the large left-wing Latin American exile communities residing there.

(S//~~WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~) During the 1974 to 1976 period, the JCR conducted its activities in Europe from behind a complex network of front organizations and sympathetic left-wing groups. It maintained contact with organizations such as the Chile Solidarity Committee, the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, the Latin American Students Association (AELA), and others. The JCR's principal front organization in France was the Argentine Solidarity and Information Center (CAIS), which was established with the assistance of the Argentinian ERP and the Montoneros. The CAIS conducted a wide variety of propaganda activities on behalf of the JCR and even went so far as to produce its own propaganda films with the help of leftist Italian filmmakers. The JCR also operates through a front organization in Sweden called the "Latin American Front" (FRELA) as well as a FRELA subsidiary front organization called the "Latin American Fund for Refugees." At one time, the Swedish Government contributed an annual appropriation of about \$240,000 to FRELA, a large part of which was reportedly channeled by the JCR into support of its insurrectionist activities.

(S//~~WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~) Additionally, the JCR worked through such Latin American-based organizations as the Latin American Press Agency in Caracas, the Argentina House, and the Mexican Solidarity Committee with the Argentina House, which is in Mexico City, and the Movement Against Imperialism and for Socialism in Argentina, which maintained offices in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Miami. Additionally, the JCR has maintained contact with several West European and Arab terrorist groups to include the Basque Fatherland and Freedom Movement, the Irish Republican Army, the West German Baader-Meinhoff Gang, one Red Army Faction, and the various Palestinian groups, such as Al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

(S//~~WNINTEL/NOFORN~~) Considerable funding support for the JCR, at least initially, came from the ERP, which in turn received financial support from Cuba to supplement its income from bank robberies and kidnappings. According to information provided by Patrisio Biedma, a member of the Chilean MIR and a high-ranking member of the JCR, ERP support to the JCR was supplemented with funds received directly from Cuban sources during the 1974-1976 time frame. Additionally, Frederico Chevas, reputedly onetime chief of JCR operations in Europe, maintained direct contact with officials from the Cuban Embassy in Rome. The JCR is known to have also received financial assistance from the Argentine Montoneros and in 1976 from Romania in reciprocation for favorable publicity the organization gave Romania.

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(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) The JCR repeatedly attempted to induce other Latin American terrorist organizations to join with it. In 1974, various terrorist groups in Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela were approached. In 1975, the Paraguayan National Liberation Front (FREPALINA) joined the JCR. The latter has also wooed various groups in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In mid-1976, the JCR was discussing incorporation of the Dominican Popular Movement, which has been moribund in the Dominican Republic since the late 1960s, and Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) Between 1974 and 1976, besides its activities in Argentina, the JCR frequently supported efforts to initiate and encourage terrorist activities in Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 1974, the JCR contributed \$500,000 in an attempt to revitalize the Bolivian National Liberation Army which had been largely inactive since 1972 because of its inept leadership, lack of popular appeal, and government suppression. In Chile, the JCR sponsored "Operation Red Boomerang" which involved an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate about 300 Chileans from Argentina into Chile to mount a terrorist campaign against the government of Gen Pinochet. In Paraguay, the JCR sponsored an operation by a group of terrorists who planned to assassinate President Stroessener and other prominent Paraguayans. That country's security forces frustrated the plot, but in early April 1976, Paraguayan security forces accidentally discovered another group, the Political-Military Organization, which was trained in exile by the ERP under JCR auspices to infiltrate and mount terrorist operations. The JCR maintained links on a continuing basis with various groups of Paraguayan terrorist exiles living in Argentina, particularly members of FREPALINA and the Movement in Defense of the Fatherland.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) Between 1974 and 1975, the badly battered Movement of National Liberation-Tupamaros (MLN-T) in Uruguay was largely sustained with JCR support. Money, personnel, and weapons have been smuggled into the country by the JCR. In 1972, the Tupamaros had been badly mauled by Uruguayan security forces and became heavily dependent first upon the ERP and then upon the JCR for support and safe havens in Buenos Aires. The safe haven status of Buenos Aires persisted until mid-1974, when Argentine and Uruguayan security forces mounted a series of highly successful operations against Uruguayan terrorist exiles living in Argentina. In the wake of these actions, large segments of the exiled Tupamaro community fled to Europe, particularly Paris, Lisbon, and various cities in Sweden and Italy.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) It was during this period of attempted expansion that the JCR became a truly international organization, boasting of representatives in Rome, Paris, Stockholm, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Berlin. Approximately 100 members of JCR -- affiliated groups took up residence in Sweden alone; another 80 were living in Italy.

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(S//NOFORN) Despite the wide perspective of the JCR's terrorist campaign plan for Latin America, its most crucial campaign was fought and lost in the country of its birth by the terrorist organization upon which it was most dependent -- the ERP, which was severely battered by Argentine security forces. The June 1976 death of Mario Santucho was a severe blow to the ERP; it deprived the organization of one of its most imaginative and dynamic leaders.

(S//~~WNINTEL~~//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) In April 1977, the Latin American connection in Europe took on an element which it has previously lacked -- a European target focus. A plot involving a mixed Latin American-West European terrorist group planning the kidnaping of a former Swedish Government minister was exposed when terrorists were arrested by Swedish security police. The group had planned to kidnap the former minister and to hold her for ransom to force release of Baader-Meinhoff gang members imprisoned in West Germany. The Latin Americans involved had established residence in Sweden as political refugees, had been involved in terrorist activities in their home countries, and had spent time in Cuba. The European terrorists and their Latin American counterparts apparently became acquainted through the Stockholm Refugee Council, an ultraleft organization which assists in the resettlement of Latin American political refugees. The kidnaping plot raised concern that eventually the JCR itself might become involved in European terrorism if it were frustrated in Latin America.

(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) Signs of the advent of such frustration were already beginning to accumulate. There was a high level of activity through the fall of 1976, but since then, JCR activities in both Europe and Latin America have tapered off significantly. With the exception of the JCR propaganda effort by the Latin American Press Agency, which was run by MLN-Tupamaros members in France, little activity has been visible. By the end of 1977, the JCR appeared to be expending much of its efforts on propaganda mechanisms, maintaining contact with an estimated 16 organizations -- many of them small Latin exile groups -- in France, including such groups as the Solidarity Committee for the Struggle of the Ecuadorean People, the Committee for the Support of the Struggle of the Argentine People, and the Guatemalan Solidarity Group. The only other recent JCR involvement of any note reportedly included provision of documentation, safe havens, and other support for militants of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation who were scheduled to be sent to Europe following their training in Cuba to prepare for ultimate infiltration back into Bolivia.

(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) Although JCS efforts to proselytize among the Latin American exile communities in France, Sweden, and Italy continued, few new members joined up. During the JCR Congress in November 1976, internal schisms developed when opposing factions began vying to gain control of the organization.

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(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT) The JCR fell to a particularly dismal state in Italy where members of the ERP and the Chilean MIR broke away from the group and began utilizing the services of the Anti-Fascist Committee Against Repression in Argentina (CAFRA), which enjoys the support of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). CAFRA also provided an alternate contact point for Mario Firmenich's Montoneros as well as the ERP, the two principal insurgent/terrorist groups in Argentina. In a further fragmentation of the Latin American exile community in Italy, the Montoneros, while maintaining nominal membership in the CAFRA, have continued to conduct their activities largely independent of not only the JCR but of the ERP and often CAFRA as well because of objections to that organization's close association with the PCI. The Montoneros' feud with the PCI is in response to the latter's unwillingness to endorse the Montoneros, the ERP, and other groups in CAFRA as legitimate political alternatives to the present Argentine Government. Finally, another JCR member in Europe, the MLN-Tupamaros organization in Italy, became disinterested in the operationally moribund JCR in Italy, while Bolivia's National Liberation Army was no longer even actively represented in that Southern European country.

MONTONERO LEADER

MARIO
FIRMENICH

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON) Another factor which has undermined the JCR in Italy appears to be the largesse of Libyan strongman Muammar Qadhafi who has reportedly been providing funds to various left-wing leaders of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) for their own use and for transmittal to Palestinians and Latin American exiles and revolutionaries in that country. PSI couriers reportedly traveled "regularly" to Malta to pick-up "large sums" provided by Qadhafi, some of which are passed to Italian Senator Lelio Basso, who in turn forwards a portion of the funds to the MLN-Tupamaros. The relative financial independence which this subsidiary funding has given the Tupamaros has been another factor in the group's lack of interest in JCR activities and in risky insurrectionist operations at home in Uruguay.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN) During meetings held in Madrid and Paris in early 1978, the JCR apparently began a major effort to reinvigorate itself by broadening its base of operations through increased cooperation with terrorist/insurrectionist groups active in various parts of the world and by becoming involved at least indirectly in operations against European targets. Organizations participating in these meetings included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Algerian-sponsored

Polisario; the Lotta Continua of Italy; revolutionary leftist groups from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, the US, West Germany, Japan, and Singapore; the Argentine ERP and Montoneros, which were represented together for the first time; the Chilean MIR; the Bolivian Army of National Liberation; the Uruguayan MLN-Tupamaros; and the Bandera Roja and the Liga Socialista of Venezuela.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN) The JCR has established regional working groups composed of Latin American, Iberian, European, North American (US and Mexico), and Asian sections. In addition, policy decisions were reportedly taken involving plans to execute Western European political figures for publicity purposes (Italian political leader Aldo Moro was not one of those considered); establish a scientific committee to study atomic weapons; and increase armed struggle, especially in the Condor countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN) The JCR's new attention to activities outside Latin America taken together with the April 1977 incident in Sweden indicate developing interest on the part of "career" Latin American terrorist exiles in European operations. This altered operational focus may be in part a reflection of its general lack of recent success against the Condor countries. Although the JCR intends to continue its efforts in Latin America, it may feel the need to diversify in the hope of achieving operational successes elsewhere to bolster its reputation.

Outlook

(S//WNINTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON) While operation Condor may have some problems integrating the financial and human resources of participating countries and may from time to time experience difficulties as the more powerful members with greater resources tend to pursue their own terrorists and somewhat neglect the interest of other countries, the organization nevertheless is likely to remain in an advantageous position with regard to the Latin American revolutionary exile community. The internal security forces of the various participating nations have largely stymied the revolutionary exiles' dream of returning to reinvigorate insurrectionist operations on a large scale. The high hopes of the exiled revolutionaries that the JCR would become a terrorist organization of transcontinental operational impact which would succeed in breathing new vigor into many of the more hardpressed Latin American extremist movements have yet to be fulfilled. Insofar as Operation Condor improves its operational capability, problems of the JCR will be that much more accentuated. However, current efforts appear to be under way to integrate JCR activities with those of other terrorist/insurrectionist groups, thus giving the JCR an operational focus in Europe as well as in Latin America. JCR preoccupation with activities outside its area of

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principal focus in Latin America may be in part a reflection of its general lack of recent success against the Condor countries and may be expected to continue as a reflection of the group's need to bolster its reputation through successes scored elsewhere. ~~(XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

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